

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 MBFR VIENNA 0245

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR EASTERN AND WESTERN END OF ROUND XIV PRESS CONFERENCES

REF: A) MBFR VIENNA 0237, B) MBFR VIENNA 0232

1. SUMMARY. THIS TELEGRAM REPORTS SOVIET DELEGATION SUMMARY PRESENTED TO JOURNALIST OF SOV REP TARASOV PLENARY STATEMENT AS WELL AS EASTERN AND WESTERN PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (OPENING PRESS STATEMENTS WERE REPORTED IN REFTELS). SOVIET DEL SUMMARY FOLLOWED SAME LINES AS PLENARY STATEMENT CRITICIZING WESTERN REDUCTIONS APPROACH (ESPECIALLY ASYMMETRIC REDUCTIONS) AND CLOSING WITH EXPRESSION OF EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO "CAREFULLY STUDY THE CHANGES INTRODUCED" BY WESTERN INITIATIVE. EASTERN PRESS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT BY CZECH REP KEBLUSEK (REFTEL A) REPEATED STANDARD EASTERN CONTENTION (E.G., EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL, EXISTENCE
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OF APPROXIMATE PARITY, CHARGES OF WESTERN FORCE INCREASES) AND ACKNOWLEDGED PRESENTATION OF NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS ABOUT WHICH "IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO MAKE ANY CONCRETE CONCLUSIONS." SOV DEL SUMMARY OF SOV REP PLENARY STATEMENT REFERRED TO "DANGEROUS PLANS FOR THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IN THE REGION OF NEUTRON WEAPONS (WHICH) HAVE

NOT BEEN COMPLETELY ABANDONED." NO OTHER REFS TO
NEUTRON IN EASTERN OR WESTERN PRESS CONFERENCES.
IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION FROM WESTERN REPORTER
REGARDING EASTERN CHARGES OF NATO INCREASES, KEBLUSEK
CHARGED NATO MANPOWER INCREASES OF 16,000 IN 1977
AND PLANNED 8,000 MAN INCREASE IN 1978. IN
WESTERN PRESS CONFERENCE, NETHERLANDS REP DE VOS
CHALLENGED THIS WITH STATEMENT THAT THERE HAVE
BEEN NO INCREASES IN OVERALL WESTERN MILITARY
MANPOWER IN AREA SINCE START OF TALKS. PRESS CON-
FERENCE EXCEPTIONALLY WELL ATTENDED BY MAJOR
EASTERN AND WESTERN WIRE SERVICES, NEWSPAPERS AND
WESTERN BROADCAST MEDIA. END SUMMARY.

END CONFIDENTIAL
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2. BEGIN TEXT:

STATEMENT BY SOVIET DELEGATION SPOKESMAN SEMENNIKOV (RUSSIAN,
TRANSLATED TO GERMAN & ENGLISH) (ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
INTERPRETER)

THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT
THE DRAFTING OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED
FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, BECAUSE OF THE UNCON-
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STRUCTIVE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES, HAS BEEN EXTREMELY
PROTRACTED. NOTING THE POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISCUSSION
ON NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND
THE EXCHANGE OF ADDITIONAL FIGURES ON THE BASIS OF THE PROPOSALS
OF THE SOCIALIST STATES OF 25 OCTOBER 1977, AMBASSADOR TARASOV
SAID THAT, HOWEVER, THIS HAD NOT YET BROUGHT THE PARTICIPANTS
ANY CLOSER TO THE MAIN GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SOME KEY NATO
COUNTRIES EVIDENTLY HAD NO SERIOUS INTEREST IN THE SEARCH FOR
MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE DECISIONS. THEIR POLICIES REVEALED AN
ATTEMPT TO GIVE PRIORITY TO THE STRENGTHENING OF THE ARMS RACE
AND TO SEEK MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER THE SOCIALIST STATES. THE
DANGEROUS PLANS FOR THE PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT IN THE REGION
OF NEUTRON WEAPONS HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLETELY ABANDONED. THE NATO
COUNTRIES CONTINUED TO REJECT THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST
STATES THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO INCREASE OF ARMED FORCES DURING
THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

CONCERNING THE PRINCIPAL APPROACH OF THE SOVIET UNION
TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMS LIMITATIONS, THE HEAD OF THE SOVIET
DELEGATION REFERRED TO A STATEMENT BY THE GENERAL SECRETARY OF
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SUPREME
SOVIET OF THE USSR MR. BREZHNEV OF 7 APRIL OF THIS YEAR ABOARD

THE CRUISER ADMIRAL SENYAVIN IN WHICH HE STRESSED "WE

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CATEGORICALLY REJECT ANY ATTEMPTS TO IMPOSE THE TERMS OF AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO US. WE HAVE SAID AND CONTINUE TO SAY THE SOVIET UNION IS IN FAVOR OF THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONCLUSION OF AN AGREEMENT BUT ONLY AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BEIN STRICT ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUALITY AND OF EQUAL SECURITY, AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD GENUINELY EMBODY THIS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE. WE DO NOT ASK THAT AN AGREEMENT SHOULD GIVE US ANY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE OTHER SIDE, BUT WE EXPECT THE OTHER SIDE TO TAKE THE SAME APPROACH ALSO." THIS IS ALSO FULLY APPLICABLE TO THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS. THE WESTERN DEMAND THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SHOULD UNDERTAKE ALMOST THREE-FOLD GREATER REDUCTIONS IN THEIR FORCES THAN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD LEAD TO A DRASTIC CHANGE TO THE BENEFIT OF NATO IN THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES, WHICH, AS THE OFFICIAL FIGURES PRESENTED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BEAR OUT, ARE CHARACTERIZED BY APPROXIMATE PARITY.

IN CONCLUDING HIS STATEMENT, THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SOVIET UNION DECLARED THAT THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST
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COUNTRIES WILL CAREFULLY STUDY THE CHANGES INTRODUCED BY THE WEST IN ITS POSITION, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY MAY HELP TO PROMOTE THE DRAFTING OF MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS. ANY STEP BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES GENUINELY DIRECTED TOWARDS EQUITABLE, MUTUAL REDUCTION OF FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND NOT GIVING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES TO ANYONE AND NOT DETRIMENTAL TO ANYONE'S SECURITY WILL MEET WITH SUPPORT FROM THE SOCIALIST STATES. END TEXT.

3. EASTERN PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. BEGIN TEXT

1. Q. (WIELAND-RETUTERS) (ENGLISH, TRANSLATED TO GERMAN & RUSSIAN) MR AMBASSADOR, YOU SAID IN YOUR STATEMENT THAT THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE EXERTED MAXIMUM EFFORTS FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE SOLUTIONS. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU -- DO YOU SEE SIMILAR ELEMENTS OF A COMPROMISE NATURE IN THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS?

A. (KEBLUSEK) (RUSSIAN, TRANSLATED TO GERMAN & ENGLISH) WE ONLY RECEIVED THESE PROPOSALS AN HOUR AGO. NATURALLY, WE NEED TIME TO STUDY THEM PROPERLY AND THEN TAKE A POSITION, SO IT IS DIFFICULT FOR ME TO ADD MORE TO WHAT HAS ALREADY BEEN SAID. I CAN REPEAT IT IF YOU WISH.

2. Q. (SCHLEICHER-FRANKFURTERRUNDSHAU) (GERMAN, TRANSLATED TO ENGLISH & RUSSIAN) MR. AMBASSADOR, YOU HAVE SAID THAT THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF NATO FORCES HAS BEEN INCREASED LATELY. COULD YOU TELL US HOW MUCH, ACCORDING TO YOUR ESTIMATION, IS THE PRESENT STRENGTH OF NATO FORCES; AND IF YOU CANNOT TELL US THAT PRECISELY, ON WHICH CONCRETE ARGUMENTS YOU FOUND YOUR ASSERTION AS TO THE INCREASE IN NATO FORCES?

A. (KEBLUSEK) (RUSSIAN, TRANSLATED TO GERMAN & ENGLISH)
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IN MY STATEMENT, I SAID THAT THE LEVEL OF NATO FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IS INCREASING. THIS STATEMENT WAS DERIVED FROM FIGURES GIVEN IN THE WESTERN PRESS. YOU HAVE READ THESE REPORTS YOURSELVES, SO I DON'T NEED TO IDENTIFY THE SOURCES. ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, THERE WAS AN INCREASE IN THE NATO FORCES IN 1977 OF 16,000 AND THERE IS A FURTHER INCREASE OF 8,000 ENVISAGED FOR 1978. UNFORTUNATELY, I CAN'T GIVE OUR ESTIMATE OF NATO FORCE STRENGTH. AS YOU KNOW, THE NEGOTIATIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL AND IT IS BETTER TO RESOLVE THESE MATTERS AT THE NEGOTIATING TABLE THAN THROUGH THE PRESS.

3. Q. (POSSANER - DIE PRESSE) (GERMAN, TRANSLATED TO ENGLISH & RUSSIAN) MR AMBASSADOR, IN WHAT YOU SAID ABOUT THE INCREASING OF THE WESTERN FORCES, YOU MENTIONED THAT YOU TOOK THAT FROM THE COMMUNICATION GIVEN BY THE WESTERN PRESS AND YOU ALSO ANSWERED MY COLLEAGUE IN THE SENSE THAT YOUR OWN ESTIMATIONS ARE CONFIDENTIAL. I SHOULD LIKE YOU TO TELL US, IF POSSIBLE, WHETHER THERE ARE BASIC AND GREAT DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WHAT THE WESTERN PRESS INDICATES AND WHAT YOUR OWN ESTIMATES INDICATE. THAT IS ONE QUESTION -- AND THE SECOND QUESTION: COULD YOU TELL US WHETHER YOUR OWN ESTIMATES ARE BASED ON WHAT YOU

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FIND IN THE WESTERN PRESS OR WHETHER THERE ARE ALSO CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF YOUR OWN IN THESE ESTIMATIONS?

A. (KEBLUSEK) (RUSSIAN, TRANSLATED TO GERMAN & ENGLISH)
I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE WITH REGARD TO FIGURES.
DELEGATIONS ON BOTH SIDES HAVE PUT FORWARD OFFICIAL FIGURES, GOVERNMENT FIGURES, AND THESE ARE KNOWN.
THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THE OFFICIAL DATA. I CAN'T ADD ANYTHING TO WHAT I HAVE ALREADY SAID AND THE QUESTION IS REALLY A REPETITION OF THE ORIGINAL ONE.

END OF EASTERN PRESS CONFERENCE

END TEXT

4. WESTERN PRESS CONFERENCE QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. BEGIN TEXT:

1. Q. (WAHA - AP) I WOULD LIKE TO GO TO THAT PART OF YOUR
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STATEMENT, IN WHICH YOU SAID THE SECOND ISSUE IS THE
QUESTION OF THE COMPOSITON OF PAHSE I SOVIET REDUC-
TIONS. DOES THIS MEAN THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN
THE PROPOSAL OF THE COMPOSITION OF PHASE I AMERICAN
REDUCTIONS?

A. (DE VOS) AS I SAID IN MY STATEMENT, ON ACCOUNT OF
THE CONFIDENTIALITY RULE, I AM SORRY, I CANNOT GO
INTO FURTHER DETAILS.

2. Q. (WAHA - AP) I HAVE A FOLLOW UP QUESTION ON ANOTHER
SUBJECT. HOW CAN THE DISCREPANCY BE RESOLVED IN
THE NATO VIEW? HAVE YOU ANY METHOD OR SUGGESTION
WORKED OUT?

A. (DEVOS) WE HAVE TO CONTINUE THE DISCUSSION OF
ADDITIONAL DATA INITIATED IN THIS ROUND. WE HOPE
THAT THAT WILL LEAD US TO IDENTIFY THE SORCES OF
THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EASTERN FIGURES AND
WESTERN DATA ON EASTERN MILITARY MANPOWER. IT
WOULD NOT BE APPROPRIATE FOR ME TO GO INTO THIS
IN ANY FURTHER DETAIL.

3. Q. (LENDVAI - FINANCIAL TIMES) I HAVE TWO QUESTIONS --
THE FIRST ONE -- THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THEY
WOULD CAREFULLY STUDY YOUR NEW PROPOSALS. DO YOU
HAVE IMPRESSIONS THAT THE EASTERN RESPONSES MAY BE
MORE POSITIVE. THE SECOND QUESTION -- COULD YOU TELL
US WHY NATO PUT FORWARD THESE PROPOSALS NOW AFTER
WE HAVE BEEN READING ABOUT THEM FOR 10 MONTHS?

A. (DE VOS) AS TO YOUR FIRST QUESTION, I WOULD ONLY
SAY THAT AFTER THE MAJOR INITIATIVE WE TOOK IN DECEM-
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BER 1975, WE HAVE NOW MADE ANOTHER IMPORTANT INITIA-
TIVE INOUR EFFORTS TO MOVE THESE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD.
THAT UNDERSCORES THE FACT THAT WE HOPE THE EAST WILL

REALIZE IT IS NOW REALLY UP TO THEM TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THEIR INTEREST IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS IS MORE THAN VERBAL AND THAT THEY TOO, FINALLY, HAVE TO COME UP WITH A GENUINE MOVE TO PUSH THESE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. THEY WILL HAVE TO MAKE A RESPONSE COMMENSURATE TO OUR INITIATIVE. WE HOPE WE WILL GET SUCH A RESPONSE IN THE NEXT ROUND.

AS TO YOUR SECOND QUESTION, AS YOU KNOW, THESE IDEAS HAVE BEEN WORKED OUT IN NATO AND WERE DISCUSSED AND DECIDED UPON SOME TIME AGO AS TO THE EXACT TIMING FOR PRESENTING THEM. IT WAS OUR FEELING THAT WE WOULD ALSO NEED SOME PROGRESS ON THE MAJOR OPEN ISSUE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS THE DATA QUESTION. TAKING ACCOUNT OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THIS IN THIS LAST ROUND WHICH HAS NOW BEEN CONCLUDED, WE HAVE FOUND THIS WOULD BE THE APPROPRIATE TIME. THE MOST FAVORABLE CONDITIONS ARE THERE TO MAKE THESE NEW PROPOSALS TO MOVE FORWARD.

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4. Q. (PEREVETSHIKOV-ISVESTIYA) MR AMBASSADOR, WHY DOES THE WEST NOT ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL FROM THE EASTERN SIDE TO FREEZE THE INCREASING OF THE ARMED FORCES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS? DOES IT MEAN THAT YOU ARE GOING, IN SOME WAY, TO INCREASE YOUR FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS? HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THIS?

A. (DE VOS) WE ARE NOT AGAINST THE FREEZE AS SUCH. WE HAVE MADE A PROPOSAL OURSELVES NOT TO INCREASE FORCES, BUT WE THINK THAT SUCH A MEASURE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN ISOLATION. OUR BUSINESS HERE IS NOT TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON NON-INCREASE, BUT TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS OF FORCES, I.E., REDUCTIONS AND ENSURING LIMITATIONS. WE WOULD NOT WANT TO DETRACT ATTENTION FROM THAT BASIC PURPOSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS HERE WHICH IS THE TASK WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN. OUR PROPOSAL FOR A NON-INCREASE CONNECTS SUCH A MEASURE WITH A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. WE WOULD ALSO THINK THAT A FREEZE AS SUCH, BASED ON THE ACTUAL FACTS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION WOULD MEAN A CONTRACTUALIZATION OF IMPORTANT EASTERN NUMERICAL SUPERIORITIES, CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT IS, SUPERIORITIES IN MANPOWER AND CONVERSELY OF WESTERN INFERIORITIES. THAT IS WHY WE THINK A FREEZE SHOULD BE CONCLUDED IN CONNECTION WITH A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD SET A GOAL OF PARITY IN MANPOWER IN THE FORM OF A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND OVERALL MILITARY MANPOWER AS THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND WHICH WOULD PROVIDE, AT THE SAME TIME, FOR SUBSTANTIAL SOVIET AND UNITED STATES REDUCTIONS AS A FIRST STEP TOWARDS SUCH AN OUTCOME. THAT IS THE SECOND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO PROPOSALS. A THIRD ISSUE INVOLVED HERE IS THAT WE HAVE, AS YET, NO AGREEMENT ON DATA. ANY FREEZE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ACTUAL FACTS OF THE SITUATION WOULD PROBABLY BECOME A SOURCE OF CONTROVERSY AND CONTENTION. THIS WOULD CERTAINLY NOT ENHANCE STABILITY, BUT WOULD RATHER BE A FACTOR IN REDUCING STABILITY. THE FIRST ISSUE INVOLVED HERE IS THAT IN THE WEST, WE COULD NOT, OF COURSE, ACCEPT ANY ARRANGEMENT IN THE FORM OF A FREEZE OR REDUCTION AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON NATIONAL FORCE CEILINGS. WE HAVE OFTEN EXPLAINED WHY SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT, WHICH WOULD INTERFERE WITH NATO'S INTEGRATED DEFENSE AND POSSIBLY MIGHT PREJUDICE THE FUTURE ORGANIZATION OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE, WOULD DIMINISH OUR SECURITY. ALL THESE REASONS TOGETHER EXPLAIN WHY THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL TO US IS UNWORKABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE. I HOPE I HAVE ANSWERED YOUR QUESTION.

5. Q. (RAYSACHER-PAP) WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE AN AGREEMENT ABOUT FREEZING OF FORCES WITHOUT MENTIONING ANYTHING ABOUT LEVELS?

A. (DE VOS) IT SEEMS TO ME WHEN THERE IS SUCH A CLEAR DISAGREEMENT ON THE DATA I.E., ON THE STRENGTHS OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA, SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD, AS I SAID, BE AN OBVIOUS SOURCE OF CONTENTION. IT WOULD NOT CONFIDENTIAL

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CONTRIBUTE TO STABILITY AND WE ARE HERE TO WORK OUT MEASURES WHICH WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY. IT WOULD BE RATHER A FACTOR DAMAGING STABILITY. THIS AGAIN PROVES HOW IMPORTANT IT IS THAT WE CONTINUE THE DATA DISCUSSION IN THE NEXT ROUND AND BOTH SIDES MAKE A SERIOUS EFFORT TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT HERE AND THAT THIS DISCUSSION LEADS TO AN AGREEMENT AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE.

6. Q. (SCHLEIER - FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU) AMBASSADOR KEBLUSEK TOLD US IN HIS STATEMENT, I QUOTE "THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES IN THE REDUCTION AREA IS INCREASING." COULD YOU COMMENT ON THIS AND COULD YOU TELL US WHETHER THE OLD FIGURE OF 777,000 WESTERN GROUND FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA IS STILL A VALID FIGURE?

A. (DE VOS) THAT WAS A FIGURE WE PUBLISHED IN 1973 WHEN WE FIRST PUBLISHED OUR DATA ON EASTERN AND WESTERN

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FORCES IN THE AREA. SINCE THEN, WE HAVE EXCHANGED NEW DATA WITH THE EAST. BOTH SETS OF DATA, EASTERN AND WESTERN, REFER TO JANUARY 1, 1976. WHEN WE

EXCHANGED DATA IN 1976, WE EXPLAINED THAT THE FIGURES FOR BOTH SIDES SHOWED A SLIGHT INCREASE AND THAT THIS INCREASE DID NOT, HOWEVER, REPRESENT AN INCREASE OF THE FORCES BUT RATHER WAS THE CONSEQUENCE OF REFINED COMPUTATION. THAT IS STILL THE CASE. ALLEGATIONS THAT THE WEST HAS BEEN INCREASING ITS MANPOWER ARE COMPLETELY UNFOUNDED. THERE HAS BEEN NO INCREASE IN THE OVERALL WESTERN MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE REDUCTION AREA. OF COURSE. ANOTHER THING IS THAT FORCE MODERNIZATION IS GOING ON ON BOTH SIDES. IT IS ALSO WELL KNOWN THAT ON OUR SIDE THERE IS REAL CONCERN OF THE TREND OF MODERNIZATION ON THE EASTERN SIDE, WHICH IMPLIES NOT ONLY THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW WEAPONS BUT ALSO INCREASES IN ARMAMENTS. THIS IS A MATTER OF CONCERN ON OUR SIDE, AS HAS BEEN EXPLAINED TO YOU IN MANY COMMUNIQUEES
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OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL MEETINGS. THE TREND IN THE EASTERN MILITARY BUILD UP IS GOING BEYOND AND IS DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE REASONABLE DEFENSIVE NEEDS OF THAT SIDE. WE HERE AS THE WESTERN NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA HAVE ALWAYS REFRAINED FROM MAKING ALLEGATIONS ABOUT INCREASES. WE THINK THAT IS NOT VERY PRODUCTIVE AND COULD ONLY DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE SERIOUS BUSINESS WHICH WE HAVE BEEN GIVEN HERE: THAT IS, TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON FORCE REDUCTIONS AND LIMITATIONS. AGAIN, IT'S CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAVE BEEN CONSTRUCTIVELY NEGOTIATING AND WE HAVE DEMONSTRATED THAT AGAIN TODAY BY THE MAJOR MOVE WE MADE. WE ARE DETERMINED TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT, WHICH IS A MORE PRODUCTIVE WAY TO ENHANCE STABILITY AND STRENGTHEN PEACE AND SECURITY THAN TO TRADE UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS HERE.

U. Q. (WIELAND - REUTERS) WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS REPRESENTED CONCESSIONS ON THE WESTERN SIDE, OR ARE THEY DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE EASTERN SIDE DURING THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS?

A. (DE VOS) AS I SAID IN MY STATEMENT, OUR INITIATIVE DEALS WITH TWO MAJOR OPEN ISSUES OF THE NEGOTIATION. WE HAVE DEALT COMPREHENSIVELY WITH SOME POINTS WE FEEL THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS HAVE PUT GREAT EMPHASIS ON DURING THESE YEARS OF DISCUSSION.

END OF WESTERN PRESS CONFERENCE

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